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Pursuant to the practice of the Juvenile Court and The District Court, PetitionerAppellant Aaron Smith is referred to as “Aaron” and Respondent-Appellee Rocio Smith
is referred to as “Rocio”.
JURISDICTION
1.

This Court has original jurisdiction over an appeal from a final order from a District

Court Order pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103(h).
2.

Pursuant to the requirements of Utah R. App. P. Rule 3(a), Petitioner Aaron Smith

filed a Notice of Appeal in the District Court on November 25, 2015. Therein, he identified
both the April 6, 2015 Order (“April Order,”) and the October 27, 2015 Order (October
Order”). (A copy of the April Order is attached hereto as Exhibit #4, the copy of the
October Order is attached hereto as Exhibit #6, and both are incorporated herein by this
reference.
3.

Because of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (“U.R.C.P.”) Rule 59 Motion, the

material differences between the April Order and the October Order, plus lack of subject
matter jurisdiction of the District Court and denial of due process, the appeal is timely
filed on November 25, 2015 as required by Utah R. App. P. Rule 4(a).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue # 1:

Was Aaron’s URCP 59 Motion regarding the April Order timely and

actionable?
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Standard of Review:

Timeliness and conformance with U.R.C.P. Rules 6(b) and 59(e)

is determined as a matter of law.1 Nonetheless, “[a] trial Court faced with an insufficient
motion has the discretion to deny the motion or allow the party who filed the motion to
supplement it.”2
Issue # 2:

Did the October Order constitute a material change or amendment of

the April Order?
Standard of Review: “[An Appellate] court must determine whether the trial court’s
modification was clerical or material.” "3
Issue # 3:

Did the District Court have the jurisdictional authority to change and

expand the Juvenile Court’s limited mandate on remand from the Utah Court of Appeals
regarding the 2013 Final Juvenile Court Order?
Standard of Review:

"[T]he propriety of [a] jurisdictional determination, … becomes a

question of law upon which we do not defer to the District Court."4
Issue # 4:

Did the Juvenile Court have jurisdictional authority to certify to the

District Court for later decision undefined and unexplained amounts of attorney fees,
costs and expenses incurred in proceedings held previously in the Juvenile Court?

1

Sanpete America, LLC v. Willardsen, 2011 UT 48, nine ¶¶ 66-68, 269 P.3d 118. A trial
court had granted a U.R.C.P. Rule 59 Motion that had been filed several days late. The
Supreme Court reversed, stating that the "only course of action was to deny the motion.
We therefore reverse … to the extent that it granted Mr. Neeley's Rule 59 Motion." Id. at
¶ 68.
2
Blosch v. Natixis Real Estate Capital Inc., 2013 UT App 214 ¶ 17, 311 P.3d 1042.
3
Hansen v. Kik, 2006 UT App 314 ¶ 7, 142 P.3d 558.
4
Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28 ¶ 6, 234 P.3d 1100.
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Standard of Review: "[T]he propriety of [a] jurisdictional determination, … becomes a
question of law upon which we do not defer to the District Court."5
Issue #5:

Did the District Court have jurisdictional authority to award attorney

fees, costs and expenses to Rocio pursuant to Utah Code § 30-3-3 when the proceedings
where they were incurred were in another Court with terminated jurisdiction and where
no such award was properly entered?
Standard of Review: "[T]he propriety of [a] jurisdictional determination, … becomes a
question of law upon which we do not defer to the District Court."6
Issue # 6: Did the District Court deny and violate due process, thus making its
judgment void, when it failed to afford Aaron a meaningful opportunity to be heard and
when it did not require Rocio to allocate requested fees, costs and expenses according to
competing causes of action and petitions to terminate parental rights and did not identify
or determine what constituted a prevailing party and prevailing claim?
Standard of Review: "[T]he propriety of [a] jurisdictional determination, … becomes a
question of law upon which we do not defer to the District Court."7
Issue # 7: Did the District Court deny and violate due process, thus making its
judgment void, when it failed to afford Aaron meaningful opportunity to be heard and
when it did not allow an evidentiary hearing on Aaron’s request for identification and
allocation of fees, costs and expenses according to competing causes of action and

5

Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28 ¶ 6, 234 P.3d 1100.
Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28 ¶ 6, 234 P.3d 1100.
7
Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28 ¶ 6, 234 P.3d 1100
6
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petitions to terminate parental rights and determination of what constituted a prevailing
party and claim?
Standard of Review: "[T]he propriety of [a] jurisdictional determination, … becomes a
question of law upon which we do not defer to the District Court."8
DETERMINATIVE LAWS
Statutes
Utah Code § 30-3-3(1):
In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate
Maintenance, or Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in
any action to establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support,
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may order a
party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert
witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or
defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the action.
Utah Code § 30-3-3(2):
In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support,
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award
costs and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially
prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award
no fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is
impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees.
Utah Code § 30-3-3(3):
“In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide money,
during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of the
other party and of any children in the custody of the other party.”

8

Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28 ¶6, 234 P.3d 1100
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Utah Code § 30-3-3(4):
“Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may
be amended during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment.”
Rules of Civil Procedure
U RCP Rule 54 (b) states that:
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When
an action presents more than one claim for relief-whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross claim, or third party claim-and/or when multiple parties
are involved, the court may enter judgment as to one or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is
no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and may be changed at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties.
U.R.C.P. Rule 59(b) states that “[a] motion for a new trial shall be served not later than
14 days after the entry of the judgment.”
U.R.C.P. Rule 6(b)(2) provides that “[a] Court must not extend the time to act under
Rules 50(b) and (c), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b).”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an award of $180,780.47 in attorney’s fees, costs and expenses
awarded to Rocio and against Aaron by the District Court. Said sum and award are
attributable to prior Juvenile Court Proceedings and not in District Court and came after
the Juvenile Court terminated its jurisdiction without taking such action on its own and
following a limited remand by the Court of Appeals, which raised no such issue or claim
by Respondent Rocio.
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Course of Proceedings
In the primary and underlying divorce proceedings, the district Court granted
primary custody of the children to Aaron. Alarming evidence of misconduct by Rocio
during visitation led to protections put in place by the District court and the granting of
sole custody to Aaron. This lead to the filing of competing petitions and proceedings in
Juvenile Court to terminate the parental rights of each other. Ultimately, neither party
prevailed on their respective petitions for affirmative relief. However, Counsel for Rocio
seeks to collect fees in excess of $180,000.00 and without any allocation as to a prevailing
claim and numerous substantive and procedural disqualifying errors. During the course of
the Juvenile Court proceedings, Aaron experienced some confusion with his former
counsel and this resulted in a subsequent appeal by him as to contempt charges raised in
the Juvenile Court. The Court of Appeals vacated the prior Juvenile Court rulings and
remanded for the limited purpose of resolving any issue of alleged prior contempt and
provide full due process through evidentiary hearing. Rocio chose to not cross-appeal and
failed to raise any claim of entitlement to attorney fees, costs and expenses in the Juvenile
Court proceedings. The Juvenile Court satisfied the Appellate mandate and found by
stipulation two minor infractions for which Aaron and his wife paid a fine. The Juvenile
Court then terminated its jurisdiction and referred the parties back to the District Court in
the continuing divorce case as it relates to child support and visitation. Rocio’s Counsel
then sought to move, after the fact, in District Court for an award of fees and costs allegedly
due to him in the prior Juvenile Court proceedings. The District Court summarily granted
Rocio’s motion without hearing and oral argument and without any allocation and no
12 of 43

identification of a prevailing party and prevailing claim. COMES NOW Appellant Aaron
and appeals the District Court action as set forth herein.
On April 20-21, 2015, Aaron filed documents associated with a U.R.C.P. Rule 59
motion. October 27, 2015, the District Court denied Aaron’s Motion. The District Court
operated on the false and mistaken assumption that (a) the Juvenile Court issued a prior
valid award for attorney’s fees, costs and expenses; (b) Rocio’s counsel filed a timely
motion to award such fees, costs and expenses; (c) the District Court inherited and held
some form of successor jurisdiction from the Juvenile Court regarding any and all matters
and with no interruption or unsatisfied substantive prerequisites; (d) no hearing and no
allocation of proportionality or identification of prevailing parties and claims.
Aaron filed a Notice of Appeal on November 25, 2015 from both Orders.
Disposition at District Court
The District Court awarded attorney’s fees, costs and expenses to Rocio and against Aaron
on April 6, 2015. The District Court denied Aaron’s U.R.C.P. 59 Motion on October 27,
2015.
FACTS
This factual summary addresses primarily subject matter jurisdiction, or “the relationship
between the claim and the forum that allows for the exercise of jurisdiction." 9 In this
matter, the Juvenile Court and District Court respectively acted beyond their jurisdiction

9

Johnson v. Johnson, 2010 UT 28 ¶ 9, 234 P.3d 1100 (quote marks and citation omitted.)
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given the facts and circumstances before them at the time of their actions. Further, the
District Court acted without a full and accurate understanding of the prior Juvenile Court
proceedings and the impact of the Court of Appeals limited remand. In these instances,
the court lacked authority to adjudicate the case in such manner and reversal on appeal is
warranted and respectfully requested.
1.

On April 29, 2013, the Juvenile Court issued a final order in the proceedings

involving the parties. It contains a prior sua sponte reference to attorney fees, costs and
expenses but no amounts are specified or allocated based on a defined sum and who
prevailed and in what proportion and on what claims. (“2013 Final Juvenile Order”.)
(Record at 0898-0901.)
2.

On May 13, 2013, Aaron filed his Notice of Appeal regarding the April 29,

2013 court decision. (Record at 0844-0846.)
3.

Two days later, on May 15, 2013 and while the appeal was then pending,

Rocio filed a motion and affidavit in Juvenile Court, listing attorney fees, costs and
expenses allegedly applicable to the prior termination of parental rights trials in Juvenile
Court and DCFS child welfare petition as well as the initial divorce and child custody
proceedings in District Court. (See Record 0552-00556;)
4.

At the same time, Rocio did not file a cross-appeal seeking to have the

Juvenile Court identify an amount of fees, costs and expenses to which she claimed to be
entitled. )

14 of 43

5.

On June 4, 2013, Rocio filed a memorandum objecting to the Petition on

Appeal filed by Aaron. Rocio asked for attorney fees to be incurred in responding to the
appeal but raised no claim for any attorney’s fees in the lower Court. (Record at 0866.)
6.

On September 6, 2013, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its ruling regarding

Aaron’s appeal. See State of Utah ex. rel. E.S. and N.S., A.S. and J.S. v. State of Utah and
R.S., 2013 UT App 222, 319 P.3d 744. (hereinafter “In re E.S”.)
7.

The Appellate opinion dealing with the Juvenile Court ruling of April 29,

2013 states: “[W]e vacate the findings of contempt and the sanctions imposed, and remand
for a hearing on the allegations of contempt. The juvenile court's order is affirmed in all
respects except for the determination of contempt, the findings of contempt are vacated,
and the matter is remanded to the Juvenile Court for a hearing on the contempt
allegations.”10 No authority was given to address or award attorney fees, costs or expenses
on remand. The only conceivable exception would be if it was found to be a function of
contempt and it was NOT. Again, the Juvenile Court award does not include a specific
and valid award of attorney’s fees. This fundamental fact is at the center of the cascading
mistaken assumptions and assertions over the course of the prior proceedings in the lower
court and which now bring this matter full circle to the Court of Appeals.
8.

On December 13, 2014, Juvenile Court Senior Judge Sterling Sainsbury held

a hearing regarding the Appellate mandate regarding contempt. (Record at 0882.) On
January 23, 2014, Judge Sainsbury executed an Order detailing how he met and satisfied

10

In re E,S,, 2013 UT App 222 ¶¶ 8-9, 319 P.3d 744.
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the remand from the Court of Appeals. (Two minor incidents were addressed, which
resulted from confusion attributable to prior explanation to Aaron from former counsel).
This Order will be referred to as the “Final Contempt Order.” A copy of the Order is
incorporated herein as Exhibit #1). Relevant portions include the following:
¶ 1. Upon mandate from the Court of Appeals to conduct contempt
proceedings against Father and Stepmother, the Court set a hearing for
December 13, 2013. Judge Sainsbury, Senior Judge, was assigned to hear
the case. …
¶ 6.
The Court finds that both the Father and Stepmother violated the
Court's orders on two separate occasions as stated above and finds that said
conduct constitutes actions in contempt of the Court. The Court further
finds that the parties' admission to [such] counts of contempt satisfies the
interests of justice and that there should be no further proceedings on the
remaining contempt charges vacated by the Court of Appeals.
(Exhibit # 1, ¶¶ 1,6.)
9.

On March 17, 2014, Judge Sainsbury entered the “Order of Hearing

(January 16, 2014,)” (hereinafter “Final Juvenile Court Order.”) (Record at 0884.) (A
copy of this Order is attached as Exhibit # 2 and is incorporated by this reference.) All
motions except Rocio’s untimely request for attorney fees were resolved in Juvenile
Court, and “the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court was terminated.” (Exhibit # 2 at 1, ¶ 1
and at 3 ¶ 14.) At that time, there was no pending matter in District Court.
10.

Neither party filed a request for certification under U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b)

regarding post-judgment motions or appeal from the Final Juvenile Court Order.
11.

On May 6, 2014 and after the Juvenile Court terminated its jurisdiction

and made no such award, Rocio filed in District Court a motion for attorney’s fees and
costs and accompanying documents including an affidavit. (Again without any allocation
16 of 43

of attorney fees, costs, expenses and prevailing claims. (Record at Page 0472) (If this
matter was supposedly previously resolved by Juvenile Court Order, why was a further
untimely and unfounded motion again attempted by Rocio in District Court?)
12.

Rocio’s affidavit on May 6,2014 in the District court was the same as

what she previously filed untimely in Juvenile Court after the issuance of the April 29,
2013 Order. (Record at 0898). Thus, a repeated and again untimely and improper motion
brought in yet another court for the same claims.
13.

On March 10, 2015, the District Court entered its initial memorandum

ruling rejecting the objections made by Aaron regarding award of attorney’s fees, costs
and expenses to Rocio. (Record at 0705; hereinafter “March Ruling”.) A copy is attached
hereto as Exhibit #3 is incorporated herein by this reference. The Court did so without
any analysis of the amount or the substantive and procedural history of the claims
brought by Rocio.
14.

On April 6, 2015, the District Court executed the Order prepared by

Rocio’s counsel. (Record at 1094; hereinafter “April Order”. ) A copy is attached hereto
as Exhibit # 4 and is incorporated herein by this reference.
15.

In the April Order, the Court sought to distinguish significant precedent

regarding what constitutes a prior and continuing waiver by Rocio of the subject claim to
more than $189,000.00 in unexplained and unallocated fees, costs and expenses:
16 . In Kendall, the Court of Appeals held that because the prevailing party
did not submit a claim for attorney’s fees, they waived the attorney fees
issues once the case went on appeal. Kendall Insurance, Inc. v. R & R
Group, Inc., 2000 UT App 235, ¶ 29.
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15. Aaron Smith [Aaron herein] correctly argues that, if a party fails to
submit a claim for attorney’s fees in a timely fashion, they may have
waived the attorney fee issues. Id. at ¶ 29.
16. Unlike in Kendall, Rocio Smith [Rocio herein] timely filed an affidavit
for fees and costs less than two weeks after the Juvenile Court entered its
Order.
17. In this matter, Rocio did timely submit her Affidavit of Attorney Fees
and Costs. Thus, there was no waiver.
(Exhibit # 3 , ¶¶ 14-17.) (emphasis added.)
17.

However, based on the Juvenile Court’s time stamp, subsequent

confirmation by the District Court shows that this was a false and mistaken assumption.
Rocio was two days late and only filed her motion with the Juvenile Court after Aaron
filed his notice of appeal two days before. (See Record at 0552-0056.)
18.

On April 20, 2015, Aaron filed and served on all parties, by electronic

filing, his Memorandum in Support pursuant to U. R.C.P. Rule 59 and Motion to Alter or
Amend including 10 exhibits. The electronic filing process separates and controls the
sequence and receipt of the filed documents but all are related and part of a single and
consolidated filing with the Court.
19.

On October 27, 2015 an Order was filed by the District Court denying the

U.R.C.P. Rule 59 motion filed by the Aaron. (Record at 1195.)
20.

Rather than address and correct its earlier false and mistaken assumption as

to the timeliness of Rocio’s motion, the Court stated the following regarding the October
27, 2015 Order (hereinafter “October Order”) :
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a.
“Aaron Smith (Aaron) moves this Court under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 59, to reverse its March 10, 2015 Ruling and its Judgment and
Order of April 6, 2015.” (October Order, Exhibit #4, at 1, ¶ 1);
b.
Additional information and arguments reviewed by the District Court
pursuant to “an insufficiency of the evidence to justify … decision, [Utah R.
Civ. P. 59(a)(6)] or an “[e]rror in law.” [Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7)] (Id. at 2, ¶
3);
c.
Rule 59 is contingent upon Rule 61 which states that:
[N]o error or defect in any ruling or order … is ground for granting a new
trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding, which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. (Id. at
2, ¶ 4);
d.
“Any error of fact made by this Court in its March 10, 2015 Ruling
does not affect the substantial rights of Aaron.”(Id. at 2, ¶ 5.)
e.
“Therefore, while this Court has the discretion to reconsider the award
made in its March 10, 2015 Ruling, the Court declines to do so and stands on
its previous Ruling.” ( Id. at 4, ¶ 19);
21.

On November 25, 2015 Aaron Smith filed a Notice of Appeal from the

District Court’s ruling on October 27, 2015 and also its previous ruling of April 6, 2015.
(Record at 1229.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this Appeal contesting both the District Court’s
April 6, 2015 Order (“April Order,”) and the October 27, 2015 Order (“October Order.”)
This is evident in three ways. First, the District Court addressed the combined filing by
Aaron of materials associated with his U.R.C.P. Rule 59 Motion. That filing stayed the
time to appeal until the October Order. Second, the October 27, 2015 Order materially and
substantially modified the District Court’s prior ruling on April 6, 2015. Thus, the filing
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of an appeal from the October 27, 2015 Order is timely. The October Order by the court
constituted a “new judgment [and] the time for appeal date[s] from the entry of that
judgment.”11 Third, the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make a later
determination of an amount of an award of fees, costs and expenses from prior Juvenile
Court proceedings after the Appellate remand was completed by the Juvenile Court and its
jurisdiction was terminated.
The Juvenile Court did not certify and there was no request from Rocio for fees,
costs and expenses. There was no reservation of such a right or claim pursuant to U.R.C.P.
Rule 54(b). These matters were also never raised by cross-appeal or challenged through
the remand proceedings in Juvenile Court. The issue of the amount of fees, costs and
expenses to be awarded was never delegated for future decision-making to the District
Court. There was no authority to do so. The awarding of fees, costs and expenses is not
included in shared jurisdictional authority pursuant to Utah Code § 78S-6-104.
The District Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the requested fees,
costs and expenses. Determination of the amount to be awarded was a prerequisite to the
subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the District Court. Having already terminated its
jurisdiction, the Juvenile Court could not issue such a determination. The District Court
held no open ended jurisdiction or authority to alter or amend some prior ruling from the
Juvenile Court, which was not raised on appeal and certainly not after remand when the

11

Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45 ¶ 22, 23 P3d. 442.
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Juvenile Court terminated its own jurisdiction, An award to be made pursuant to Utah Code
§ 30-3-3(4) was and is no longer applicable.
Even if the District Court somehow retained subject matter jurisdiction to
independently consider the requested fees, costs and expenses, the District Court failed to
limit a recoverable amount to those sums that Rocio claims to have specifically incurred
because of the actions of Aaron instead of requiring his payment for those expenses which
were predominantly incurred in her unsuccessful petition to terminate his parental rights.
Further, the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because it denied due
process of law and failed to allow Aaron to fully and fairly present his objections and
opposition to the Court.
For all the foregoing, the District Court did not have authority to award fees, costs
and expenses in favor of the Rocio and against Aaron.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
I

AARON’S APPEAL IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT
“The right to an appeal is a valuable constitutional right and ought not be denied

except where it is clear the right has been lost or abandoned.”12 Pursuant to Utah Code
§78A-4-103(2)(h), Aaron has a statutory right to appeal “domestic relations cases” from
District Court to the Utah Court of Appeals. The initial judgment of the District Court
awarding fees, costs and expenses to Rocio was entered on April 6, 2015 (“April Order”)
(A copy of the April Order is attached as Exhibit #1, and is incorporated herein by this
reference). After Aaron’s URCP Rule 59 Motion was filed, information not previously

12

Adamson v. Brockbank, 120 Utah 52, 60, 185 P.2d 264, 268 (1947).
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disclosed by Rocio then came to light. It was then brought to the Court’s attention that
Rocio’s earlier motion was in fact untimely. The actual filing date was two days later
than what Rocio stated in its motion to the Court. Nonetheless, the District Court
eventually denied the same in its order dated October 27, 2015. (“October Order”) (A copy
of the October Order is attached as Exhibit # 6, and is incorporated herein by this
reference.) That order is now appealed and Aaron’s notice of appeal was filed on
November 25, 2015.
A.

Sufficiency of U.R.C.P. Rule 59 Motion to Stay Time for
Appeal As a Matter of Discretion and of Law

“A motion is an application made to the Court for the purpose of obtaining a ruling
or order directing some act to be done in favor of the applicant.”13 Based on the express
language contained in the April Order, a primary purpose of the U.R.C.P. Rule 59 Motion
was to bring to the District court’s attention the need for correction of a critical factual
presumption. Rocio’s motion for fees, costs and expenses was NOT timely filed in
Juvenile Court. The language of the April Order expressly presumed and confirmed what
has since proven to be a material false and mistaken assumption. The District Court
suffered from previously undisclosed information. Such mistake and misinformation
justifies a finding that claims to attorney fees, costs and expenses were, in fact, waived by
Rocio.

13

DeBry v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah App. 1992) (citation
omitted.)
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On October 27, 2015, the District denied Aaron’s Objection without hearing and
oral argument as requested by Aaron. The Court stated summarily “that the proposed
order reflects the Court’s ruling accurately.” Thus, without affirmatively indicating any
non-compliance with U.R.C.P. Rule 59(e), the October Order merely states that “[t]his
matter comes before this Court pursuant to Aaron’s (Aaron Smith) Motion Pursuant to
U.R.C.P. Rule 59 filed April 21, 2015.” (NOTE: That date is in error. It was filed
electronically the day before).
B.

Material Differences Between April Order and October Order Stay the Appeal

Time.
Because the October Order contained material differences from the April Order,
the appeal time was thereby stayed.
1.

Authority of Court to Sua Sponte Correct and Issue New Orders.

[A] judge has the inherent authority to ensure that his or her rulings are
accurately memorialized and can correct misstatements of those rulings at
any time, no matter how the error might come to his or her attention. All
Courts of general jurisdiction have the discretion … ‘to recall and control
its process, to direct and control its officers, including attorneys as such,’
for the purposes of ‘maintain[ing] and protect[ing] the integrity and
dignity of the Court, . . . secur[ing] obedience to its rules and process, and .
. . rebuk[ing] interference with the conduct of its business.’ Barnard v.
Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993) (first omission in original)
(emphasis omitted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).14
There is no time restriction when necessary material information may be provided to the
District Court. Also, there is no restriction on who may propose or draw attention to the

14

Warner v. Warner, 2015 UT App 16, ¶ 27, 319 P.3d 711
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need for correction. The filings by Aaron in April of 2015 met this criterion. He provided
the matters and argument regarding the October Order.
According to the practice of the Juvenile Court, the date stamp is placed on the
documents on the date they are first received by the Court. The time stamp date on Rocio’s
filings is May 15, 2013. Since the filing of the order was on April 29, 2013, it is now clear
that the filing did not occur until sixteen (16) days after entry of the Order. In addition, the
provisions of Rule 54 (d)(2) U. R.C.P. regarding fees and costs require service and filing
in court be made within 14 days after the entry of judgment. The District Court accurately
stated the following in its first ruling: “Aaron is correct when he argues that, if a party fails
to submit a claim for attorney fees in a timely fashion, they may waive the attorney fee
issue.” (Exhibit # 3, March 10, 2015 Ruling at 3.)
Based on the foregoing, the filing by Rocio of the claim for fees and costs was
untimely. As such, neither Rocio nor the District Court may rely on the statements in the
April 29, 2013 Order regarding fees and costs because of the failure of Rocio to timely file
for the same in Juvenile Court. At this juncture, continuing with the substantially identical
request for fees and costs in District Court does not salvage and cannot excuse the failure
to file on time in the Juvenile Court (the court of origin).
2.

October Order Constitutes a Modification or Amendment of Material Matter
The Utah Supreme Court has held “[w]here the modification or amendment is in

some material matter, the time [for appeal] begins to run from the time of the modification
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or ame4ndment.” 15

Long-standing precedent reveals that when the full and accurate

context is taken into account, even a nunc pro tunc motion to correct an error dismissing a
party that occurred by reason of inadvertence and clerical mistake can be considered to be
of a material nature.
The right to an appeal is a valuable and constitutional right and are not to be
denied except where it is clear the right has been lost or abandoned… Test
in the case under consideration is whether or not this right of appeal is been
lost.…
[W]here a belated entry merely constitutes an amendment or modification
not changing the substance or character of the judgment, such entry is merely
an in pro trunk entry which relates back to the time the original judgment
was entered, and does not enlarge the time for appeal; the modification or
amendment is in some material matter, time begins to run from the time of
the modification or amendment.…
The modification or amendment in this case change and inconsistent
judgments one of consistency, rendering the defendant Federal Homes,
Inc., liable for and was previously some doubt existing as to its liability. In
the opinion of the members of this Court, there was this was a sufficient
importance to change the character of the judgment. The order amending
the judgment was a modification of a material matter and enlarging a right
running to the plaintiff. … The effect of this amendment was to create a
new judgment for purposes of appeal, and the time in which an appeal can
be taken commenced to run from the date of the entry of an nunc pro tunc
order.16
a. The Defense of Waiver Was Treated as Being Valid
in the April Order But Was Eliminated in the October Order
Aaron submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to the request of Rocio for the
District Court to award fees, costs and expenses. Among other things, it was argued that
the failure to timely submit a request to be awarded these monies served to waive any such
15
16

State v. Garner, 2005 UT 4, ¶ 11, 106 P.3d 729 (emphasis added.)
Adamson v. Brockbank, 120 Utah 52, 59-61, 185 P.2d 264, 268 (1947).
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claim of entitlement. The following precedent was specifically reviewed and discussed as
authorizing and supporting this conclusion:
Lastly, Defendants assert that the trial Court erred by capping attorney fees
and costs at $17,500 when the parties' promissory note provides that all fees
are to be reimbursed to the prevailing party. The trial Court in its ruling
awarded Defendants attorney fees and related costs reasonably incurred in an
amount not to exceed $17,500, with the actual amount to be determined upon
the submission of appropriate affidavits to the Court and Plaintiffs within ten
days after the entry of the order. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants failed to
request the allowance of any attorney fees in this case and therefore have
waived the right to recover such fees. Indeed, Defendants did not submit a
claim for attorney fees, and as a result, the trial Court did not award or
determine an actual amount of attorney fees or costs to Defendants. Because
Defendants did not submit a claim for attorney fees, they waived the attorney
fee issue, and we do not address it.17
In the reply of Rocio in support of the initial request for fees, costs and expenses, it was
represented that
[t]his matter is clearly distinguishable from Kendall. In this matter, the
mother submitted her claim for attorney’s fees and costs. The trial court
[Juvenile Court] addressed a claim [and] indicated that it would err in
ordering the amount of the fees, but not until the matters pending on appeal
were addressed.18
In the April Order, the Court used this argument to distinguish controlling precedent
regarding waiver as follows:
14. In Kendall, the Court of Appeals held that because the prevailing party
did not submit a claim for attorney’s fees, they waived the attorney fees
issues once the case went on appeal. Kendall Insurance, Inc. v. R & R
Group, Inc., 2000 UT App 235, ¶ 29.

17

Kendall Insurance, Inc. v. R & R Group, Inc., 2008 UT App 235, ¶ 29, 189 P.3d 114.
Reply Memorandum to Opposition to Motion by Rocio for Attorney Fees and Costs at
4; Record at 1181 (Emphasis Added)
18
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15. Aaron correctly argues that, if a party fails to submit a claim for
attorney’s fees in a timely fashion, they may waived the attorney fee issues.
Id. at ¶ 29.
16. Unlike in Kendall, Respondent timely filed an affidavit for fees and
costs less than two weeks after the Juvenile Court entered its order.
17. In this matter, as [Respondent] did timely submit her Affidavit of
Attorney Fees and Costs, thus, there was no waiver.

***

21. As the Juvenile Court retained the issue of fees and costs and Rocio
timely submitted her request for attorney’s fees, the fees and costs were not
waived.
***
38.
Respondent filed their affidavit [in] this case a May 3, 2013, only four
days after the Juvenile Court’s April 29, 2013 Order.”
(Exhibit #4, at ¶¶ 14-17, 21, 28.) A straightforward reading of these portions of the April
Order leads to the inescapable conclusion that if the submission of the documentation of
as filed with the Juvenile Court were not timely, they would have been waived.
The Court’s early apparent endorsement of the doctrine of waiver and which
favored Aaron, was significantly changed in the October Order. In the later order, the
Court apparently reversed and backtracked from its previous broad recognition of the
waiver doctrine. Instead, it now stated (summarily and without hearing or argument) it
had “used the 14 day rule merely as a guideline for timeliness” (Exhibit # 6 at 3, ¶ 10,)
and that “failure to submit a claim for attorney’s fees in a timely fashion may result in a
waiver, not that it will.” (Exhibit # 6, at 2 ¶ 7.)
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This change is both material and detrimental to Aaron as it eliminates what was
previously recognized as a valid defense by the District Court.
b. The Full and Accurate Context of Undisclosed Information Provides Unique
Evidence of Materiality
The March 10, 2015 ruling of the District Court and the April Order prepared by
counsel for Rocio affirmatively dismissed the defense of waiver asserted by Aaron because
the Court then relied on the representation of a timely filing in Juvenile Court.

After

Rocio was confronted with the irrefutable evidence that the filing did not occur as stated in
the rulings of the District Court, counsel responded as follows: “The Court already… found
that the claimed attorney fees and their costs were timely submitted. Aaron has not
demonstrated that the Court should disturb its prior finding and amend the award of
attorney’s fees and costs.”19 This response makes it clear that but for the actions of Aaron,
the erroneous factual assumptions in the District Court’s ruling and Order would not have
been corrected. Based on the foregoing obligations, the need to correct what Rocio failed
to disclose, and resisted disclosing thereafter, was a material matter before the court.
c.

Even A Finding of No Substantial Right Does Not Preclude Materiality
The District Court found that “[a]ny error of fact made by this Court in its March

10, 2015 Ruling [and April Order] does not affect the substantial rights of Aaron[.]”
(Exhibit #6 at 2 ¶ 5.) The District Court stated:
[t]he received date stamps indicate that Rocio filed her affidavit 16 days after
the entry of the Order, not within 14 days as this Court originally believed.
However, under Utah Code § 30-3-3, the parties’ decree, and the order the
Juvenile Court, this does not make a difference.
19

Opposition to U.R.C.P. Motion at 7; see Record at ____.
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(Exhibit #6 at ____¶ 9.)
For reasons that follow, reliance on the Code, the decree of divorce and the orders
of the Juvenile Court do not provide the legal authority to uphold the District Court’s Order
and award of fees, costs and expenses to Rocio. Because of this, Aaron has a “substantial
right” to not be obligated to pay the ordered fees, costs and expenses. The provisions of
U.R.C.P. Rule 61 do not justify the failure of the District Court to recognize and apply
applicable law, which precludes such a judgment against Aaron.
II.
THE JUVENILE COURT HAS NO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO
DELEGATE DECISION-MAKING ON FEES, COSTS AND EXPENSES TO THE
DISTRICT COURT
No certification regarding future action concerning fees, costs and expenses was
ever made by the Juvenile Court to the District Court. Further, the Juvenile Court had no
subject matter jurisdiction tor authority to delegate to the District Court its decisionmaking regarding fees, costs and expenses arising from prior Juvenile Court proceedings.
A.

On its Face, the Final Juvenile Court Order Did Not Certify the Question or

Obligation for Finding Amount of Fees, Costs and Expenses to the District Court
On March 17, 2014, Judge Sainsbury entered a final order titled Order of Hearing
(January 16, 2014,) (hereinafter “Final Juvenile Court Order,” Exhibit #2. This completed
his review on remand, finalized the case and terminated the jurisdiction of the Juvenile
Court. The matter was then returned to the District Court as a normal ongoing Divorce
proceeding with minor children.
After years involving two competing private termination of parental rights petitions
and a child welfare petition, the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court was terminated. In the
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absence of additional child welfare claims that would subject the children and their parents
to the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, there would be no renewal of the jurisdiction of
the Juvenile Court. There is no language in the Juvenile Court’ order stating that “issues of
… attorney’s fees” were certified for resolution in the District Court. In any event, the
Juvenile Court could not have certified the request of Rocio for fees, costs and expenses.
There was no reservation of her right pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b). These matters were
also never raised by cross-appeal nor challenged or contested in the remand proceedings in
Juvenile Court.
B.

The Juvenile Court Lacked Authority To Certify To The District Court
The Untimely and Improper Request Of Rocio For Attorney’s Fees
1.

There Is No Evidence of Juvenile Court Compliance with
U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) to Reserve A Claim Pre-Appeal

An examination of the 2013 Final Juvenile Court Order confirms there was no
compliance with the requirements of U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b). The Court’s ruling states,
“[t]his is the FINAL ORDER of the Court pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
7(f)(2), and no additional order is necessary.” (Record at 0901.) While an order
complying with Rule 7(f) (2) U.R.C.P. does not preclude satisfying the strict
requirements of Rule 54 (b) U.R.C.P., it did not occur in this case.
Rule 54 (b) U.R.C.P. requires that three conditions must be satisfied before an
interlocutory appeal is to be certified as a final and appealable order. See Utah R. Civ. P.
Rule 54(b). Only one of the three requirements applies here and thus no certification was
warranted. The first requirement is that “there must be multiple claims for relief or
multiple Parties.” Id. This is satisfied in the opening paragraph of the Order where the
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court indicated that three different petitions had been “at issue” in Juvenile Court
proceedings.
The second requirement is that “the order must be one that would otherwise have
been appealable, but for the fact that there are other claims.” Id, The provisions of Rule
52(b) Utah R. Juv. P. indicate that the Order was subject to an absolute right to appeal.
“Appeals taken from juvenile court orders related to abuse, neglect, dependency, [and]
termination … proceedings must be filed within 15 days of the entry of the order appealed
from.” Id. Thus, the Juvenile Court Order was subject to a direct appeal. Aaron exercised
the right to appeal. No “other claims” of any party interfered with the appeal. Rocio cannot
demonstrate that there were “other claims” that would have prevented an appeal to be taken
regarding fees, costs and expenses.
The third requirement is that the trial court must articulate in the order an express
determination that there is no just reason to delay the interlocutory appeal. Id. On its face,
it is evident that the April 23, 2013 Order contains neither findings nor the conclusory
language required under U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b). In addition, Utah Supreme Court precedent
indicates that they are to make a finding as to the amount of financial liability. This, too,
precluded certification pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b).
The trial court reserved the question of damages on the guarantee claim
against Bonneville and made no determinations as to the claims against the
other defendants in the case. Bonneville appeals. Because only a portion of
the claims against Bonneville was resolved by the trial court's ruling, the
question of the remedy remaining to be determined, we find that the summary
judgment ruling failed to dispose completely of either a claim or a party
as required by rule 54(b). Therefore, the order is not final and cannot be
appealed to this court.
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2.

Failure of Rocio to Cross-appeal Precludes Claimed Entitlement
to Fees, Costs or Expenses

Utah R. App. P. Rule 52(b) states that in a child welfare proceeding, “[a] notice
of cross appeal may be filed within the 15 days for filing a notice of appeal or within 5
days after a notice of appeal is filed, whichever period last expires.” The April 29, 2013
Order was appealed by Aaron on May 13, 2013. Rocio had until May 18, 2013, to cross
appeal the Juvenile Court’s failure to award an amount of fees, costs and expenses. She
did not do so. “Because the [she] did not cross-appeal the [juvenile] court's judgment,
which did not award fees, [she is] not entitled to any fees or costs associated with the
prior proceedings before the [juvenile] court.”20 This is because
[i]n an instance where the court has appellate jurisdiction, an appellant must
allege the lower court committed an error that the appellate court should
correct. If an appellant does not challenge a final order of the lower court
on appeal, that decision will be placed beyond the reach of further review.21
3.

The Juvenile Court Could Not Substitute The District Court
For Itself as Relates to Future Action on its Final Order

After failing to apply and mistakenly abandoning its earlier recognition of the
waiver doctrine, the District Court cited instead the statutory provisions of Utah Code
§30-3-3 to justify its award of attorney fees, costs and expenses. However, those
financial awards may only be made “during the course of the action or in the final order
or judgment.” Utah Code §30-3-3 (4). Rocio did not file for fees, costs and expenses
during the course of the action, final judgment or order that was filed by the Juvenile

20
21

Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31 ¶ 32, 158 P.3d 540.
Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 7, 194 P.3d 903.
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Court on April 29, 2013. Rocio failed to raise the issue of fees, costs and expenses on
remand when the prior sanctions were vacated. Having failed to seek in Juvenile Court
an award of fees, costs and expenses prior to appeal, or on cross-appeal, or during
consideration of the case after remand, Rocio did not take the necessary steps to fulfill the
jurisdictional requirement for an award of fees, costs and expenses. It had to occur
during the “course of the action or in the final order or judgment” that was part of the
Juvenile Court proceedings, the 2013 Juvenile Court Order, and those matters addressed
in the Final Order following remand. .
In 2004, the Utah Supreme Court determined that a Juvenile Court, which
terminated custody in an adoption proceeding, did not have subject matter jurisdiction “to
enforce a pre-adoption visitation order… hear an order to show cause… [or] award
attorney’s fees.” 22 In this case, on March 17, 2014, the Juvenile Court terminated its
jurisdiction over the parties and their children. Following similar analysis, in this case, the
final Juvenile Court Order eliminated the jurisdictional authority of the Juvenile Court to
revisit any award of fees, costs and expenses.

As the Juvenile Court was without

jurisdictional authority, it follows that the District Court could not claim some form of
legally recognized delegated authority from the Juvenile Court to enter an award as now
claimed and requested by the Rocio.

22

State of Utah ex rel. B.B., 2004 UT 39 ¶ 20, 94 P.3d 39.
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III.
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS NO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
TO AWARD FEES, COSTS AND EXPENSES IN PRIOR JUVENILE COURT
PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the District Court’s:
lack of jurisdiction is alone sufficient to void its judgment, and there is no
need for … setting it aside under Rule 60(b)(4). A showing of lack of
jurisdiction, in other words, could never be futile, as a jurisdictional defect is
enough by itself to void the judgment.23
The repeated “substance” of the assertions herein establishes the claim of a jurisdictional
defect.24
THE PRIOR REVIEW BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AND REMAND TO THE
JUVENILE COURT ON THE LIMITED ISSUE OF POSSIBLE CONTEMPT
FINDINGS PRECLUDES ANY CLAIM OF LATER JURISDICTION AND
AUTHORITY OF THE DISTRICT COURT TO AWARD ATTORNEY FEES AND
COSTS RETROACTIVELY IN FORMER PROCEEDINGS IN ANOTHER COURT.
A.

District Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Alter Final Judgment on Remand
In 2015, the Utah Court of Appeals stated that a District Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to alter a judgment that had been ruled upon by an appellate court.
[¶26] Therefore, the 2013 Order attempting to award post-September 2004
rents did not enforce, but rather altered, the 2004 Amended Judgment.
Because the 2004 Amended Judgment was a final judgment affirmed on
appeal, the district court lacked jurisdiction to alter it. See Mid-America
Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, ¶ 13, 216 P.3d 352; Frost v.
District Court of First Judicial Dist., 96 Utah 106, 83 P.2d 737, 740 (Utah
1938). " A judgment or order entered by a court lacking subject matter
23
24

Judson v. Wheeler RV Las Vegas, L.L.C., 2012 UT 6, ¶ 15, 270 P.3d 456
Judson v. Wheeler RV Las Vegas, L.L.C., 2012 UT 6, ¶ 21, 270 P.3d 456
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jurisdiction is void and does not affect the rights of any party." State v.
Vaughn, 2011 UT App. 411, ¶ 12, 266 P.3d 202. Accordingly, the 2013
Order is void, and we vacate that order.25
The 2013 Final Juvenile Court Order did not provide for an amount of fees, costs or
expenses to be awarded to Rocio. The Appellate also did not mandate such an award..
Rocio did not appeal or take any other action challenging the Final Order on remand. . The
later award by the District Court of fees, costs and expenses to Rocio matches the same
prohibited pattern of the district court cited above. It “did not enforce, but rather altered,”
the previous judgment. Because the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to do
so, it is “void and does not affect the rights of any party.”
B.

Termination of the Juvenile Court Jurisdiction Eliminates Ability to Make Award
On March 17, 2014, Judge Sainsbury entered a final order named Order of

Hearing (January 16, 2014,) (hereinafter “Final Juvenile Court Order” Exhibit #2.). This
completed his review on remand, finalized the case and terminated the jurisdiction of the
Juvenile Court. He ruled as follows: “The jurisdiction of the juvenile court is terminated
and [the case] is referred back to the district court.” (Exhibit #2 at 3, ¶ 14.) Neither
party filed a request for certification under U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) of any post-judgment
motions, an appeal from the Final Order or conclusion of all Juvenile Court proceedings.
In 2004, the Utah Supreme Court determined that a Juvenile Court that had
terminated custody over an adoption proceeding, did not have subject matter jurisdiction
“to enforce a pre-adoption visitation order… hear an order to show cause… [or] award

25

Mardanlou v. Ghaffarian, 2015 UT App. 128 ¶ 26, 351 P.3d 114 (emphasis added.)
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attorney’s fees.”26 “[O]nce legal relationship of parent and child is established, Juvenile
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction with the adopted child to the requirements for
jurisdiction are satisfied.”27 The Juvenile Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, it
could neither enforce previous agreements nor award attorney fees, costs and expenses
because it had terminated its own jurisdiction over the parties.
In similar fashion, the Juvenile Court terminated its jurisdiction over Aaron, Rocio
and their children. In he same manner, there is no exclusive jurisdictional authority of the
Juvenile Court defined under Utah Code § 78A-6-103. There is no basis for the suggestion
that the Juvenile Court could somehow transfer to another court the responsibility and
authority to determine the amount of fees, costs and expenses incurred in prior Juvenile
Court proceedings and when the Juvenile Court itself did not do so. . There is no indication
under Utah Code §76A-6-104 that the District Court and Juvenile Court shared
jurisdictional authority to make such a finding and award in this case.
C

Without Juvenile Court Determination of Amount, District Court Does Not Have
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In the 2014 case o5f Zelig v. Uintah County, the Utah Court of Appeals

recognized that Utah Code §78 B-1-151 (3) grants the Juvenile Court authority to
determine the amount of the expert witness fee the party responsible for paying the fee.
Therefore, we conclude that the Juvenile Court – the court that heard the
underlying case and appointed the expert in the first place – was the
appropriate court to determine the reasonableness of the work Doctor Zelig
performed, said his fee, and determine who was responsible for payment.
26
27

State of Utah ex. rel. B.B., 2004 UT 39 ¶ 20, 94 P.3d 39.
State of Utah ex rel. B.B., 2004 UT 39 ¶ 17, 94 P.3d 39.
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Because we vacate the district court’s judgment concluded his never
properly before it, we need not reach the other issues that Uintah County
raised on appeal.… We therefore also conclude that in the instant case, and
the time and the posture it was brought, was never properly before the
district court. We therefore vacate its judgment.28
In similar fashion, the Juvenile Court in this case had sole responsibility for setting the
amount of attorney’s fees, costs and expenses applicable to those proceedings over which
it had sole, exclusive jurisdiction.
IV.

The Subject Award is Void Because the District Court Failed to Afford
Due Process to Aaron

Aaron recognizes that
[a] judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous." Wright & Miller,
supra, § 2862. Rather, a " judgment is void under rule 60(b)(4) if the court
that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or parties, or the
judgment was entered without the notice required by due process."
Due process requires notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.29
“Thus, due process requires … a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the course of
[court] proceedings.”30 Without the allocation of fees costs and expenses and identifying
prevailing parties and claims and no hearing and oral argument as requested, he was

28

Zelig v. Uintah County, 2014 UT App 69 ¶¶ 7-8, 323P.3d 610.
Migliore v. Livingston Financial LLC, 2015 UT 9 ¶¶ 26-27, 347 P.3d 394 (citations
and internal quote marks omitted.)
30
In re Adoption of J.S., 2014 UT 51 ¶ 29, 358 P.3d 109 (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added.)
29
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deprived of a meaningful opportunity to object. His procedural due process rights were
denied and not met.
Included in his initial Opposition to the request for fees, costs and expenses, Aaron
objected to the lack of a proper allocation and adequate notice of the claim.: “Since she
has not prevailed on all counts, or is not entitled to attorney fees on all counts, this court
“may not award wholesale all attorney’s fees requested that have not been allocated as to
separate claims and/or parties.”31 “If not allocated, fees may be denied altogether.”32 It is
further argued:
It also does not appear that costs have been timely applied for. Pursuant to
Rule 54(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, notice of the claim and ability to
object to the actual amounts claimed must be allowed. As no timely notice
was allowed, the claim must be denied.33
Since the amounts were not allocated or ruled upon in any respect by the Juvenile Court,
there is a denial of due process by not requiring this procedure and adherence to
controlling precedent. Aaron has been denied the right to have a “meaningful”
opportunity” to address the claim for fees, costs and expenses.
The District Court also refused to grant a hearing to Aaron to address the
fundamental contested matters before an award of fees, costs and expenses. An award of
attorney fees, costs and expenses is a matter of equity and is subject to the discretion of
the court. Aaron was denied due process of law when his request for a hearing was

31

Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998).
Commerce Financial v. Markwest Corp., 806 P.2d 200, 204 n. 4 (Utah. App. 1990).
33
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion by Respondent for Attorney Fees and Costs,
and 8; Record at ____.
32
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denied. He was entitled to establish his present financial status, and provide evidence as
to why the failure of the Rocio to prevail on her efforts to terminate his parental rights is
a substantial reason to discount or eliminate such a large amount given all the errors and
missing grounds or authority for such action by the District court. .
Whether speaking of the April Order or the October Order, the District Court’s
failure to provide adequate notice and explanation of allocated fees, costs and expenses in
relation to what may legally and equitably be recognized as a prevailing party and claim
and the financial condition of the party to be charged with such a financial burden and the
District Court’s failure to have an evidentiary hearing as requested, these denials of due
process are sufficient to set aside both Orders under U.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). A separate motion
is not required when matters before the District Court raise all the abundantly evident issues
associated with this claim.
CONCLUSION
Both parties sought in Juvenile court to terminate the other’s parental rights and
neither party prevailed on those claims. The case was ultimately closed by the Juvenile
court while also terminating its jurisdiction. The case was returned to the District Court
for further post-divorce proceedings if needed in relation to the children. Appellee’s
current ongoing attempt to immediately charge, garnish, seize, attach and collect more
than $189,000.00 is unconscionable. Reversal and correction by the Court of Appeals is
respectfully sought and duly requested.
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ADDENDUM

Exhibit # 1

Final Contempt Order

Exhibit # 2

Order of Hearing (January 16, 2014) (“Final Juvenile Court Order”).

Exhibit # 3

Ruling of District Court on March 10, 2015 (“March Ruling”)

Exhibit # 4

April 6, 2015 District Court Order (“April Order”)

Exhibit # 5

Ruling of the District Court on September 28, 2015 (“September Ruling”)

Exhibit # 6

October 27, 2015 District Court Order (“October Order”)

Exhibit # 7

Decree of Divorce Between Aaron and Rocio

Exhibit # 8

Court Docketing Statement
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